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  This paper investigates the effect of disclosing information on the 
discriminatory behaviour against immigrants in the Spanish rental market. 
We conduct a field experiment where emails are sent showing interest on 
vacant rental apartments. Fictitious applicants whose names represent 
different ethnic groups send emails with different amount of information 
about their ability to pay the rent. Our results show that applicants with a 
Moroccan sounding name are 15 percentage points less likely to be 
contacted by the property owner than those with a Spanish name. We also 
find that revealing positive information about the socioeconomic status of 
the Moroccan candidate increases the probability of being contacted by 8 
percentage points. However, the information revealed does not completely 
eliminate discriminatory behavior, suggesting the presence of negative 
attitudes towards immigrants. 
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 31 Introduction
Evidence gathered over the past decades shows that ethnic minorities face substantial discrim-
inatory behavior in a wide range of market transactions, from getting a job to renting a ﬂat.1
The nature of ethnic discrimination and how it can be overcome is of interest to researchers and
policy makers. Is that discriminatory behavior due to the lack of knowledge about the abilities
of minorities to perform market transactions or is it due to the true dislike or animosity against
them? Would learning about the ability of a particular individual reduce the occurrence of
discrimination or are members of minority groups stigmatized by their origin?
This paper conducts a ﬁeld experiment to quantify and understand the sources of discrimi-
nation against immigrants in the Spanish rental housing market. We send emails in response to
rental advertisements in 20 major cities. We signal the ethnic origin of the applicant by signing
the email with native sounding names and foreign sounding ones. To study the reasons behind
discrimination, we manipulate the emails to provide diﬀerent amount of information about the
socioeconomic status of the applicant. We alternate the transmission of no information (i.e.
just showing interest in the ﬂat) with the signalling of positive information (i.e. work as a uni-
versity professor). Comparisons of the response rates conditional on the applicant’s ethnicity
and the amount of information revealed allow us to measure the degree of discrimination and
learn about its sources.
The study of discrimination in the Spanish rental market is relevant in several dimensions.
First, Spain is a paradigmatic case of massive immigration in a very short time span. Between
1995 and 2009 the share of foreign-born population shifted from 1% to 12%. Second, housing
location in Spain is important for the provision of public services such as schools and hospitals.
Location is also important for employment opportunities and wages (see, for example, Zenou,
2009; Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor, 1999; and Kain, 1968). Thus, discrimination in the housing
market may negatively aﬀect the assimilation of immigrants, amplify the negative eﬀects of
labor market discrimination and perpetuate diﬀerences between natives and the foreign-born
population. The scarce evidence on immigrants’ assimilation in Spain suggests that Eastern
European and Hispanic immigrants assimilate employment and occupation-wise, while there
is limited evidence of labor market assimilation among African immigrants (Amuedo-Dorantes
and de la Rica, 2007).
Field experiments have been commonly used to uncover discrimination in labor, housing
and consumer markets. Traditionally, ﬁeld experiments were based on personal approaches
where trained auditors enquired about vacant ﬂats or job oﬀers. Audit studies for the US
housing market reveal that blacks and Hispanics are shown substantially less housing units
1See for instance Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for evidence of discrimination in the labor market and
Riach and Rich (2002) and Yinger (1998) for discrimination in consumer markets.
4than white clients (see, for example, Yinger, 1986; Page, 1995 and Ondrich, Stricker and Yinger,
1999). However, Heckman and Siegelman (1993) and Heckman (1998) argue that the results
in the audit studies are likely to be aﬀected by the idiosyncrasy of the testers. An alternative
approach is to conduct experiments using written applications. Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2004) study the presence of racial discrimination in the labor market by sending resumes to
job oﬀers. They use the racial soundness of names to study discrimination against blacks in
the US job market. Carpusor and Loges (2006) adapt this approach to test for discrimination
in the housing market. They make enquiries via email regarding available apartments in the
US. They signal ethnicity through Arabic, African-American or European sounding names and
ﬁnd that Arab and African-American applicants receive signiﬁcantly fewer responses than their
white counterparts. A similar study conducted by Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) reveals
that ethnic and gender discrimination exists in the Swedish rental housing market.
The identiﬁcation strategy in our correspondence testing experiment also relies on the for-
eign soundness of names. In Spain, the immigrant population is relatively heterogeneous. By
nationality, the most numerous groups come from Romania (14.2%), Morocco (12.7%), Ecuador
(7.4%) and Colombia (5.2%).2 For Hispanics and Rumanians the names are virtually undistin-
guishable from those of natives. Therefore, we are restricted to focus our experiment only on
Moroccan nationals.
To analyze the sources of discrimination we investigate how revealing information aﬀects
the chances of being contacted by the property owner. Discrimination can occur if the prop-
erty owner is uncertain about the applicant’s ability to pay. Accordingly, the owner can infer
the missing information from the average of the ethnic group the applicant belongs to. The
diﬀerential treatment based on average group characteristics has been deﬁned as statistical dis-
crimination. Alternatively, the property owner may have a strong personal bias against ethnic
minorities and be willing to forgo a proﬁtable business opportunity to avoid interaction with
them. This is known as taste-based discrimination. If negative attitudes against immigrants
are the main source of discrimination then revealing information about the reliability of the
potential tenant should not aﬀect the property owner’s behavior. In contrast, if minorities
are statistically discriminated, providing information about the socioeconomic status of the
applicant should increase the chances of renting a ﬂat. We argue that the Internet-based ﬁeld
experiment oﬀers the possibility of realistically provide diﬀerent amount of information and
therefore helps us to distinguish between the diﬀerent sources of discrimination.
Disentangling statistical from taste-based discrimination is important for policy design
aimed at guaranteeing equal opportunities among natives and immigrants. One strategy the
government can follow is try to aﬀect public opinion and people’s attitudes towards minori-
ties. However, this strategy would only work if negative attitudes against foreigners were the
2Source: Spanish Statistical Institute, Registry Data 2009.
5source of discrimination. An alternative strategy is to minimize uncertainty regarding the im-
migrants’ ability to pay the rent. That would only be a successful strategy if uncertainty about
the probability of rental payment was the source of discrimination.
We ﬁnd evidence of a substantial amount of discrimination against immigrants in the Span-
ish rental market. When only the origin of the candidate is revealed, an email with a Moroccan
sounding name is 15 percentage points less likely to get a response from the property owner
than a similar email with a Spanish sounding name. Our results also indicate that part of
this diﬀerential treatment is due to statistical discrimination. On average, a “high-quality”
Moroccan candidate (i.e. one that signals a prosperous employment situation) has about 8 per-
centage points higher probability of being contacted than a Moroccan who does not provide any
information about his/her socioeconomic status. However, revealing positive information does
not completely eliminate the response rate diﬀerential against immigrants. A “high-quality”
Moroccan applicant still has, on average, 12 percentage points less chances of being contacted
by the owner than a “high-quality” native. Our results by gender provide further insights to
understand the sources of discrimination. First, in the absence of information, discrimination is
much higher for Moroccan males (21 percentage points) than for Moroccan females (10 percent-
age points). Second, the signal of a prosperous employment situation reduces the diﬀerential
treatment with respect to equivalent natives to 15 percentage points for males, while it does
not aﬀect that for females, which remains equal to 10 percentage points. We conclude that the
reduction in the male response rate diﬀerential after disclosing information indicates that part
of the observed discriminatory behavior is due to the negative perception about Moroccan ap-
plicants’ reliability. However, the large response rates diﬀerentials, for both males and females,
that still remain after the information is revealed suggest that property owners tend to dislike
Moroccan candidates.
Our results are subject to a number of potential caveats. First, the comparison between
any pair of applicants (e.g. Moroccans with no information and natives with no information)
may be inﬂuenced by the presence of other candidates with diﬀerent characteristics. We show
that our ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of a third and fourth candidate when
we compare applications across origins or informational sets. Second, the Internet may not be
the most common ﬂat searching method. And third, as argued before, the use of soundness of
names is not a valid strategy to detect discrimination against other immigrant groups in Spain.
This could pose an external validity problem for our results since there is some evidence that
Moroccans appear, together with Rumanians, as one of the less trusted groups by the native
population.3 To address these two last concerns, we conduct a telephone based audit study
3The survey ”Attitudes towards discrimination by ethnic or racial origin” conducted by the Spanish So-
ciological Research Center (CIS: Centro de Investigaciones Sociol´ ogicas) in 2007 reveals that 51.3% of native
respondents distrust a particular group of immigrants. The most distrusted groups are Rumanians (29.3%),
6and ﬁnd results very similar to those in our main experiment. There is a diﬀerential treatment
against Moroccans (around 10 percentage points) and Moroccan men are substantially more
discriminated than Moroccan women (14 versus 7 percentage points). We also show that
discrimination against Hispanics is of similar magnitude.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design.
Our main results are presented in Section 3 followed by a discussion in Section 4. Section 5
shows the results of the telephone audit study and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Experimental Design
This experiment is based on the email correspondence testing method. We send written appli-
cations to rental ads on the Internet. Information about housing units for rent is obtained from
one of the most popular buy and sell sites in Spain, Loquo.com. Loquo is a network of local
online classiﬁeds similar to Craigslist in the US. The main categories are housing, goods for
sale, community, personals, jobs and business services, local events and community discussion
forums. On Loquo.com people can place ads to buy, sell or rent housing units. Owners can
advertise their properties at no cost. Similarly, individuals interested in a particular item can
email the owner free of charge. The only information required is the name, email address and
a short message.
Our experimental design is aimed at answering three main questions: (a) Are applications
sent by immigrants treated diﬀerently than those of natives? (b) Do immigrants beneﬁt from
providing positive information in their applications? and (c) Does the diﬀerential treatment
disappear as the quality of the potential tenant increases? In order to answer these questions,
we send batches of either 2, 3 or 4 emails to 1809 rental ads providing diﬀerent amount of
information about the applicant. In particular, we experiment with two information sets, the
“origin” and “quality” of the potential tenant. Our results are based on comparing the response
rates to emails sent by applicants of diﬀerent origin and quality to the same ﬂat. Since we vary
the number of emails sent to each ﬂat we can test whether the direct comparison between
any two candidates is aﬀected by the characteristics of the applicants’ pool. For instance, it
could be that the diﬀerence in response rates between immigrants providing diﬀerent amount
of information is aﬀected by the inclusion of a native candidate.
In order to signal the “origin” we use the soundness of names. This represents a limitation to
study discrimination against particular immigrant groups whose names are similar to Spanish
names (i.e. Hispanics and Rumanians). In contrast, Moroccans, who constitute the second
largest group of immigrants in Spain, are ideal for the study since their names are markedly
Moroccans (28.8%), Eastern-Europeans (7.9%) and Hispanics (7.6%).
7diﬀerent from Spanish names.4
Previous studies ﬁnd evidence of gender discrimination against males in the rental market.
For example, Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) show that in Sweden males are almost 13 per-
centage points less likely to be invited to a ﬂat showing than females. In our setting, to prevent
gender discrimination to alter our results, male and female candidates apply to diﬀerent housing
units.
To decide on which names are uniquely Moroccan and which are uniquely Spanish, we use
name frequency data collected by the Spanish National Statistics Institute in 2007. We ex-
periment with the most popular Spanish male names (i.e. Manuel, Antonio, Jos´ e and Juan)
and female names (i.e. Ana, Isabel, Carmen and Mar´ ıa). To create several applicants we ran-
domly allocate to these names the four most common Spanish surnames (i.e. Garc´ ıa, Gonz´ alez,
Fern´ andez and Rodr´ ıguez). We also employ the most common Moroccan names for males in
Spain (i.e. Mohamed, Ahmed, Rachid and Youssef ), and the most common for females (i.e.
Rachida, Aicha, Naima and Khadija). We then randomly allocate to these names the four
most common Moroccan surnames (i.e. El Idrissi, Mohamed, Saidi and Serroukh).
We created an email address for each of the ﬁctitious applicants. The email accounts were
created from 3 diﬀerent providers: gmail, hotmail and yahoo. For example: jose.garcia@hotmail.com;
mohamed saidi@gmail.com or ahmedserroukh@yahoo.com.5
To understand the sources of diﬀerential treatment across ethnic groups we vary the quality
of the potential tenant. We experiment with two diﬀerent scenarios. We send a standard email
showing interest in the ﬂat without any information about the candidate other than the name.
This represents what we call a “standard” applicant. Alternatively, to signal a “high-quality”
applicant, the email contains a detailed description of his/her current employment situation
and occupation. We consulted with several real estate agents about who constituted the ideal
tenant for landlords. University professors and banking clerks were identiﬁed as highly reliable
occupations in terms of their ability to pay the rent.
When no information other than the name is provided we send the Spanish version of one
of the two following emails:
“Standard” applicant
“Hello,
I am interested in renting this apartment. I would be very grateful if you contacted me.
Thank you. NAME”
or alternatively:
4In Section 5 we conduct an telephone based audit study to explore discriminatory practices against other
nationalities.
5As the names are very common we need to use numbers when creating the addresses. For example: ahmed-
serroukh35@yahoo.com.
8“Hi,
I would like to have a look at the ﬂat. Please email me if the ﬂat is still available. Thank
you. NAME”.




I am interested in this ﬂat. I work for an important commercial bank. I have recently moved
to (city) and I am looking for a ﬂat where to live for at least a couple of years. I would be happy
to provide a ﬁnancial guarantee. Please contact me if interested. Many thanks. NAME”
or alternatively:
Hello, I am a Professor at the University of (city). I have been living in (city) for a couple of
years and I would like to ﬁnd a new apartment. I have a permanent contract with the University.
I am very interested in your ﬂat and I would be very grateful if you could contact me. Best
regards. NAME”.
Comparing the response rates across “origin” and “quality” allows us to study discrimination
in the Spanish rental market. Diﬀerences in response rates within the same “quality” and gender
type of emails are informative about the diﬀerential treatment received by immigrants relative
to natives. Alternatively, diﬀerences in the response rates to “high-quality” and “standard”
applicants within the same “origin” and gender capture the returns to information about the
socioeconomic status of the applicant.
We should highlight a few aspects about our experimental design. First, the diﬀerence in the
response rates between immigrants and natives sending standard emails (i.e. no information
other than the name) is a rough measure of the amount of discrimination in the rental market.
This diﬀerential treatment is likely to be a mixture of pure immigrant dislike (taste-based
discrimination) and the owner’s priors about the quality of the potential tenant (statistical
discrimination). In contrast, the diﬀerence in the response rates to emails sent by “high-
quality” candidates should purge a substantial part of the statistical discrimination. In this
case, the two applicants signal a high occupational status and the only diﬀerence is the origin of
the candidate. We believe that the occupation of the potential tenant is the most relevant piece
of information for the owner. However, there may be other relevant variables for the owner’s
decision that may diﬀer across ethnic groups and are missing in the email sent. For example,
family size or the ability to take care of the ﬂat. The owner may still use group belonging to
predict this information. We return to these issues when discussing our results in Section 4.
The correspondence test was conducted between January and March 2009. During this
period, our candidates applied to all apartment ads on Loquo without any restrictions as to
9size and cost. We focus on 20 of the largest Spanish cities.6 For each available unit we recorded
the date, the heading of the ad, the geographical location of the apartment (city and complete
address), whether the owner was a private person or a company, the name and gender of the
property owner (if available), the number of rooms, and the rental cost per month. All property
owners were tracked during the experiment to avoid being contacted more than once by each
applicant.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the 1809 ﬂats where our ﬁctitious applicants sent
emails. As the table shows, we sent 2 emails (one from a high-quality immigrant and another one
from a standard immigrant) to 396 ﬂats, 2 emails (standard native and standard immigrant)
to 427 ﬂats, 3 emails (high-quality native, high-quality immigrant and standard immigrant)
to 881 ﬂats and 4 emails (high-quality native, high-quality immigrant, standard native and
standard immigrant) to 105 ﬂats. The table indicates that ﬂats where diﬀerent number of
emails were sent are of similar characteristics. For example, the average price per month for
all ﬂats considered is 607.87 euros which is very similar to the average price for the ﬂats where
batches of 2, 3 or 4 emails were sent. About 30% of the vacant properties are rented from real
estate agents and the rest from private owners. Almost 50% of the property owners are males.
The average number of rooms for all ﬂats is slightly higher than 2.
To avoid systematic discriminatory behavior towards a particular kind of professional occu-
pation (i.e. university professor or banker), we alternatively sent the two versions of the emails.
The order of the applications was also controlled. Each applicant was the ﬁrst to apply in 1/n
of the cases, where n is the number of applications sent to that particular apartment. The time
delay between applications for the same apartment was between half an hour and one hour.
Information on vacant apartments was gathered on Tuesdays and emails were sent on Tues-
days and Wednesdays each week. The results from the experiment were collected one week
after. First, we recorded whether or not the property owner contacted the applicant. Sec-
ond, if the applicant was contacted we recorded whether he/she was invited for a ﬂat showing.
Invitations to ﬂat showing were politely declined.
3 Results
In this section we compare the response rates to emails sent by applicants with uniquely Spanish
sounding names to that of applicants with clearly Moroccan sounding names and diﬀerent
amount of information disclosed. In what follows we present the most relevant results of the
experiment.
6A Coru˜ na, Alicante, Almer´ ıa, Badajoz, Barcelona, Bilbao, C´ adiz, C´ ordoba, Girona, Granada, Madrid,
M´ alaga, Murcia, Pamplona, Pontevedra/Vigo, Salamanca, Tarragona, Toledo, Valencia and Zaragoza.
103.1 Are applications sent by Moroccans treated diﬀerently than
those of natives?
We start by comparing the response rates to applications sent by natives and Moroccans when
no information other than the name is provided (i.e. standard applicants).
Table 2 contains the results when the two standard applicants send emails to 532 property
owners (corresponding to ﬂats in columns 3 and 5 of Table 1). The ﬁrst column of Table
2 reports the percentage and the number of cases when both the native and the immigrant
applicant are contacted by the property owner. The second column reports these numbers when
none of them gets an answer. The number of cases when only the native or only the immigrant
is contacted are reported in column 3 and 4 respectively. We deﬁne net discrimination as the
diﬀerence between these two columns. The last column of the table shows the test statistic for
the null hypothesis of no discrimination (i.e. the diﬀerence in response rates equals zero). This
is a two sample paired t-test for equal means. The ﬁrst line in the table displays the results for
all the applicants and the second and third separately by gender.
The average response rate is around 52%, since 274 out of the 532 property owners con-
tacted replied to at least one of the candidates. The main message from Table 2 is that when
potential tenants restrict the information just to their “origin” (through the soundness of the
names), natives are contacted more often than Moroccans. Natives have about 15 percentage
points higher probability of getting an email back from the property owner than immigrants.
Interestingly, this diﬀerence is substantially larger for males (21 percentage points) than for
females (10 percentage points), suggesting both a racial and a gender component in the trans-
action. These results are remarkably similar to those in Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) who
ﬁnd a 20 percentage points diﬀerential treatment for male Arabic sounding names compared
to male Swedish names.
The results in Table 2 are the composite of comparing standard applicants across origins
under two diﬀerent competition settings. In 80% of the cases only the two standard candidates
apply to the same ad, while in the remaining 20% of the cases two additional high quality
applicants (one native and one immigrant) also apply.7 When only two emails are sent, the
diﬀerential treatment is 15.69 percentage points, while it is 13.83 in the presence of high-
quality applicants. These two numbers are not statistically diﬀerent from each other. Hence
we conclude that the results are robust to the inclusion of high quality applications.
Note that being contacted by the property owner is just the ﬁrst step in the process of
renting a ﬂat. Thus, our results identify a lower bound of discrimination. One could also
look at the next step of the transaction by comparing invitations to a ﬂat showing after being
7Obviously we can only control the number of applications within our experiment as we do not have infor-
mation about the number of emails received by each particular ﬂat.
11contacted. However, it is diﬃcult to construct an indicator from this information. In some
cases it is not straight forward to assess whether the owner is inviting the candidate for a
ﬂat showing or simply asking additional information. We attempted to construct an indicator
for being invited to a ﬂat showing. The results, available upon request, indicate that once
contacted, natives and immigrants are treated equally in terms of invitations to see the ﬂat.
Hence examining diﬀerences in response rates seems appropriate to measure discrimination.
3.2 Do immigrants beneﬁt from providing positive information in
their applications?
Our previous ﬁndings indicate that there is discrimination against immigrants when no objec-
tive information about the quality of the applicant is provided. Next, we investigate whether
the diﬀerential treatment received reﬂects animosity against Moroccans or simply lack of in-
formation about their reliability. In a pure taste-based discrimination model owners simply
discriminate against immigrants because of dislike. Thus, the provision of information about
the quality of the candidate should not aﬀect the owner’s discriminatory behavior. However, if
the diﬀerential treatment is due to the lack of information, revealing some of the candidate’s
socioeconomic characteristics should have an eﬀect on the chances of being contacted.
We study the eﬀects of revealing positive information about the quality of the applicant
on the owner’s discriminatory behavior. Accordingly, we compare the response rates to appli-
cations by Moroccans with positive information about their socioeconomic status (i.e. high-
quality applicant) and those by Moroccans without such information (i.e. standard applicant).
The diﬀerence in response rates provides an idea of the amount of discrimination that can be
attributed to missing information about the immigrant’s ability to pay.
Table 3 contains the results when the two types of Moroccan applicants send emails to 1382
property owners (corresponding to ﬂats in columns 2, 4 and 5 of Table 1). There are several
features from the table that should be highlighted. First, the overall response rate is 53.98%,
slightly higher than in the previous case. Second, providing positive information about the
employment or the job status increases the chances of being contacted by the landlord. Appli-
cants with Moroccan sounding names signaling that they are high-quality potential tenants are
8 percentage points more likely to get a reply than those who do not provide any information
about their socioeconomic status. Third, the returns to information seem to be similar across
genders. Net discrimination in favor of immigrant candidates providing positive information is
9.25 percentage points for males and 7.74 percentage points for females, and these two num-
bers are statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, we cannot reject that they are equal. Finally,
we highlight that the results in Table 3 represent a lower bound for the presence of statistical
discrimination as we do not provide all the information that may be relevant for the transaction
12(e.g. family status, pets and so on).
In this case, the inclusion of a native candidate could be particularly relevant. Accordingly,
we send batches of two emails (i.e. standard and high-quality immigrant applicants); batches
of three emails adding a high-quality native applicant; and ﬁnally batches of four emails with
all candidates considered. The results are extremely robust. The diﬀerence in the response
rate between high-quality and standard immigrants is 8.88, 8.17 and 9.52 percentage points
respectively.
Summing up, the results indicate that revealing information about the socioeconomic status
of the potential tenant signiﬁcantly increases the chances of being contacted by the property
owner, by about 8 percentage points both for male and female immigrants. We conclude that
at least part of the diﬀerential treatment reported in the previous section responds to the signal
extraction problems that characterize statistical discrimination.
3.3 Does the diﬀerential treatment disappear as the quality of the
potential tenants increases?
Finally we explore whether providing positive information about the quality of both the im-
migrant and the native candidate aﬀects the discriminatory behavior of property owners. We
compare the response rates between natives and immigrants when both send emails signaling
that they are high-quality applicants. If the diﬀerential treatment for natives and immigrants
is only due to signal extraction problems and if occupational status is the only relevant infor-
mation for the owner’s rental decision, then we should expect similar response rates to emails
sent by high-quality candidates independently on their origin.
Table 4 contains the results when the two high-quality applicants send emails to 986 property
owners (corresponding to ﬂats in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1). The response rate in this
case is 64.40%, higher than in previous cases. The results in the table indicate that high-
quality native candidates are 12 percentage points more likely to be contacted than high-
quality immigrant candidates. This suggests that disclosing information does not completely
eliminate discrimination. In fact, the reduction in the response rate diﬀerential with respect to
the standard applications is rather modest, 3 percentage points (see Table 2). However, this
number conceals a large gender diﬀerence. For females, disclosing information does not aﬀect
discrimination, which remains about 10 percentage points (see Tables 2 and 4). However, it does
for males. Discrimination against high-quality male immigrants is 6 percentage points lower
than discrimination against their standard counterparts (i.e. 21 versus 15 percentage points).
These results again support the presence of statistical discrimination, at least for males.
The diﬀerent treatment received by native and immigrant high-quality candidates is less
likely to be aﬀected by the inclusion of standard applicants. This is conﬁrmed when conditioning
13on the number of emails sent.
3.4 A linear probability model
Our results so far indicate that there is a signiﬁcant amount of discrimination based on the
soundness of the applicant’s name. We are now interested in learning whether that diﬀerential
treatment varies along some independent variables related to ﬂat and owner characteristics.
We ﬁrst estimate a linear probability model where the dependent variable is an indicator of
whether the candidate i has been contacted by the property owner j (Cij) and the explanatory
variables are an indicator that takes value 1 if the candidate is an immigrant (Iij), an indicator
for a high-quality candidate (Qij), and the interaction between these two variables. We also
include dummy variables to capture date (φd), research assistant (φra) and city (φc) ﬁxed eﬀects.
Cij = α + βIij + γQij + δIij × Qij + φd + φra + φc + ij. (1)
The coeﬃcient β captures the diﬀerential treatment between natives and immigrants in the
absence of relevant information. The coeﬃcient γ captures the returns to information about
the employment and job status of the applicant, and the coeﬃcient δ captures any diﬀerence
in those returns between immigrants and natives.
Table 5 shows the estimates of equation (1) for the whole sample (column 1), and separately
for males (column 2) and females (column 3). In the estimation we use 4709 observations
obtained from sending batches of 2, 3 and 4 emails to the 1809 ads. The results conﬁrm
our previous ﬁndings. Moroccan immigrants without information are on average 15 percentage
points less likely to be contacted. Revealing positive information about the socioeconomic status
increases the chances of being contacted by 6 percentage points. The interaction between the
information and immigrant indicator, although positive (3 percentage points), is not signiﬁcant
for the whole sample.
When the model is separately estimated by gender, we do ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
returns to information for immigrant males relative to their native counterpart. Diﬀerential
treatment decreases by 7 percentage points when male immigrants signal they are high-quality
applicants. This is consistent with the results in Tables 2 and 4, where discrimination decreases
from 21 to 15 percentage points after disclosing information. In contrast, there is no evidence
of diﬀerences in the relative returns to information for females.
The diﬀerential treatment received by immigrant candidates may vary by ﬂat and property
owner’s characteristics. Table 6 investigates this possibility by re-estimating equation (1) for
diﬀerent sub-samples of ﬂats along three dimensions: price per room (i.e. below or above
median price), private owner or real estate agent, and property owner’s gender. Each line
in Table 6 shows, for each sub-sample of ﬂats, the estimated coeﬃcient of the diﬀerential
14treatment in the absence of information (β), the returns to information (γ) and the diﬀerence
in those returns between natives and immigrants (δ). The results are reported for the overall
sample and separately by gender. We highlight several interesting features from Table 6. First,
discrimination against immigrants seems higher in more expensive ﬂats (above the median price
per room) than in relatively cheaper ones (below the median price per room). On average,
immigrants are 16 percentage points less likely to be contacted when applying to expensive
ﬂats and 12 percentage points less likely in cheaper ones. Second, we ﬁnd that private property
owners seem to discriminate more than real estate agents (16 versus 12 percentage points).
However, the diﬀerential treatment applied by private property owners is highly biased against
male immigrants (23 versus 7.4). There is also evidence that in this case immigrant males receive
a statistically signiﬁcant premium of 7 percentage points when providing positive information
about their socioeconomic status. Finally, the last two lines in the table reveal that both male
and female property owners discriminate against immigrants (26 and 25 respectively). While
the discriminatory behavior of female owners does not depend on the gender of the applicant
(27 for males and 23 for females), this is not the case for male owners who seem to discriminate
substantially more against male candidates (34 compared to 17). Interestingly, the last two
columns in the table indicate that only immigrant applicants that share gender with the owner
beneﬁt from disclosing positive information relatively to their native counterparts.8 In all, the
results in Table 6 indicate that the patterns we ﬁnd in our base line speciﬁcation are conﬁrmed
in the diﬀerent sub-samples. The new insight is that the larger amount of discrimination against
male immigrants seems to be driven by the behavior of private property owners.
4 Discussion
The results of our experiment indicate that for two individuals with a similar job, searching for
a ﬂat, the one with a Moroccan name would receive fewer contacts. An extreme interpretation
of our ﬁndings would be to conclude that discrimination in the rental market is mostly driven by
animosity against Moroccans (i.e. taste-based discrimination). Indeed, we observe a substantial
response rate diﬀerential for high-quality immigrant candidates when competing against natives
of comparable characteristics. However, two pieces of evidence point against this extreme
interpretation. First, information improves the response rates of Moroccan applicants, around
8 percentage points. This indicates that immigrants do beneﬁt from signalling a prosperous
employment career, which does not ﬁt with the predictions of a pure taste-based discrimination
model. Second, we ﬁnd higher returns to information for immigrant than for native males.
This result is in line with traditional models of statistical discrimination (see Aigner and Cain,
8We can only infer the gender of the owner if he/she signs the returning email. Therefore, results should be
interpreted with caution since this variable is only available for 51% of the observations in the sample
151977), which predict that signals about the quality of the applicant should be more informative
for the minority group.
However, we are also skeptical to conclude that the diﬀerential treatment observed in the
data is evidence of just signal extraction problems. Statistical discrimination models could not
easily account for the gender diﬀerence observed in the relative returns to information. These
models could only explain the gender pattern if either information was irrelevant for females
or if the quality of the information females provide was noisier. Both these explanations seem
implausible. First, we ﬁnd that native and immigrant females equally beneﬁt from disclosing
information (see column 3 in Table 5). Second, it is unlikely that the “quality” of the signal is
worse for women since we use the same jobs (alternatively bank clerk and university professor)
for both genders. Furthermore, the information provided is easily veriﬁable since in order to
sign a rental contract the applicant has to provide documentation regarding the wage and labor
market status.
In all, we interpret our results as evidence that, at least for men, part of the raw discrimina-
tion observed in the rental market is caused by the owners’ perception that a Moroccan name
signals low ability to pay. Nevertheless, the absence of an information premium for immigrant
women suggests that additional factors are responsible for the diﬀerential treatment. It could
be that other information relevant for the transaction is missing (i.e. marital status, number
of household members and so on). However, it is diﬃcult to think what kind of information
is more relevant than the ability of the tenant to pay the rent. Moreover, the gradient in the
reduction of discrimination is not steep enough. Crucial information, such as proof of ability to
pay, only reduces the diﬀerential treatment between immigrant and native males in 6 percentage
points. Thus, it is unlikely that the remaining diﬀerential treatment, 15 percentage points for
men and 10 percentage points for women, can be completely eliminated by providing additional
information. This suggests the presence of some animosity against immigrant tenants.
5 The telephone audit study
Our experimental design based on written applications has two potential caveats. First, sending
an email may not be the usual matching method between tenants and owners. And second,
the correspondence test is not valid to detect discrimination against immigrants whose names
are similar to the native population. To circumvent these problems we conduct an audit study
where trained auditors from diﬀerent nationalities make phone calls to property owners. The
identiﬁcation strategy in this case is based on diﬀerent accents across nationalities. This ex-
perimental approach is subject to the common criticisms of audit studies (see, for example,
Heckman and Siegelman, 1993 and Heckman, 1998) and it does not allow us to diﬀerentiate the
sources of discrimination. However it is useful to obtain a ﬂavor of the amount of discrimination
16against diﬀerent minority groups and when using a more traditional ﬂat searching method.
The experiment based on phone calls was carried out in May and June 2008. We select a
random sample of the advertised housing units in Loquo. We employ pairs of trained auditors,
one Spaniard and the other with a markedly foreign accent. We focus on the largest non-
European groups of immigrants: Moroccans and Hispanics (i.e. Ecuadorians and Colombians).
During the phone call, auditors inquire about the ad and try to arrange a visit to the property.
We quantify the degree of discrimination by comparing the number of invitations received by
natives and foreigners.
As in the previous experiment, we employ paired-matched applications instead of randomly
assign applicants to landlords. Auditors make phone calls to the same ad during a short
time span (i.e. 30 minutes) to ensure that property owner characteristics and housing market
conditions remain constant. Auditors are matched on the basis of ﬁctitious age, occupation
(e.g. bank oﬃcer or university professor), income and family characteristics. Finally, the order
of the applications is controlled. The native applicant is the ﬁrst to apply for an apartment
in half of the cases. During the call, auditors complete a layout with the characteristics of
the rental housing unit such as price, area and street, number of rooms, garage and ﬁnancial
guarantees. At the end of each day, we call to cancel the visit.
It is important to note that the results of this experiment are not strictly comparable to
the correspondence test. For example, the control of information is harder when making phone
calls. We highlight that we do not attempt to distinguish between standard and high-quality
applicants in this experimental setting. The auditors are chosen among postgraduate students
at University of Alicante and, hence, constitute a selected sample among immigrants. For this
reason, they are trained to provide the same information as a high-quality applicant in the
previous experiment, but this is only revealed if prompted by the landlord. Accordingly, the
amount of information provided varies with the nationality of the applicant and the interest of
the owner. In most cases diﬀerential treatment occurs before any information is revealed. But
in other cases we observe diﬀerential treatment after providing some information. Furthermore,
the cost of rejecting an applicant on the phone may be diﬀerent to that of rejecting an electronic
application.
The results of the audit study are presented in Table 7. This approach returns very similar
results to those in the main experiment. From the 201 property owners contacted, total net
discrimination is around 10 percentage points. We again observe that discrimination is higher
for males (15 percentage points) than for females (7 percentage points). Hence the telephone
based test corroborates the results of the correspondence test. Furthermore, we ﬁnd similar
patterns of discrimination against the two ethnic groups employed in the experiment. Table
8 suggest that, on average, Moroccans are 10 percentage points less likely to be invited for a
ﬂat showing than natives, compared to 11 percentage points for Hispanics. On the whole, our
17results suggest that discrimination seems to be present regardless of the contact method, and
that there are no substantial diﬀerences across Moroccans and Hispanics.
6 Conclusions
This paper conducts an Internet-based ﬁeld experiment to study discrimination against im-
migrants in the Spanish rental market. Our results reveal important traces of discrimination
against rental candidates with Moroccan sounding names. There is also evidence that disclos-
ing positive information about the socioeconomic status of the candidate improves the chances
of being contacted for both Moroccan male and female applicants. However, diﬀerences in
response rates between natives and immigrants still persist even when the candidates signal a
high ability to pay the rent. One reading of our results is that the upgrading of skills and quali-
ﬁcations that would come naturally for second generation immigrants are unlikely to completely






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Observations 4709 2240 2469
R2 0.070 0.086 0.089
∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗: Signiﬁcant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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